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In the United States, the term "civil rights" originally referred to people's
"natural rights" to life, liberty, and property as protected by civil law.I Many
civil rights advocates believed that individuals had not only the right to equal
protection of the laws ("equal rights"),2 but also to "economic liberty.' 3 Eco-
nomic liberty included the right to own and alienate property and the right to
contract freely and to have the goverInment enforce those contracts ("freedom
of contract"). Because slavery was the dominant civil rights issue of the
nineteenth century, a subsidiary of freedom of contract, the right to pursue a
lawful profession and to alienate one's labor in a free market ("occupational
liberty") became an inviolable part of the Republican civil rights ideology4 and
the most prominent issue on the post-Civil War national civil rights agenda5
1. See C. BoLIcK, CHANGING COURSE: CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS 3-11 (1988).
2. Throughout this Note, the phrase "equal rights" is used in its classical liberal sense, ie., the right
to be free from discrimination by the government.
3. C. BOLICK, supra note 1; Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 379, 395 (1988).
4. See Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221, 225 (1987) ("It was the... concept of natural rights which
was the foundation of the consensus Republican conception of the rights to which blacks were necessarily
entitled. Perhaps foremost in the anti-slavery pantheon was the right to freely buy and sell one's labor.").
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), which most scholars agree was
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment, focused on economic liberty. See Note, Resurrecting
Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1369
(1990).
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In the 1886 case ick Wo v. Hopkins,6 the United States Supreme Court
embraced the prevailing civil rights philosophy. Relying on both equal rights
and economic freedom principles, the Yick Wo Court struck down a discrimina-
tory state restriction on Chinese laundries. Unfortunately, the dualistic theory
of civil rights did not long prevail on the Court. In subsequent decisions over
the next twenty-two years, the Court protected only the occupational liberty
aspect of civil rights.
This Note argues that the distinction the Supreme Court made between
economic liberty cases and equal rights cases between 1886 and 1908 was a
false one. In Part I, this Note summarizes the major equal rights/occupational
liberty cases of the era and notes that the Court struck down facially neutral
restrictions'on occupational liberty, but upheld explicitly discriminatory race
and gender-based economic regulations. In Part II, the Note argues that when
the Court protected occupational liberty by striking down facially neutral
regulations it substantially advanced the economic prospects of Blacks, women,
and immigrants. In other words, by protecting economic liberty, the Court also
advanced equal rights. In Part II, the Note shows that when the Supreme Court
upheld discriminatory economic regulations, it not only abandoned the principle
of equal rights, but also dealt a blow to economic liberty. Part IV of the Note
points out that the Court's turn-of-the-century bifurcation of the classic Ameri-
can vision of civil rights continues to this day, but in reverse; equal rights are
currently protected, while occupational liberty is largely ignored. The Note
concludes by calling for a revival of judicial protection of the occupational
liberty part of the civil rights equation.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS CASES BETWEEN 1886 AND 1908
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Between 1886 and 1908, the Supreme Court decided several cases that
raised issues of both equal rights and economic liberty. In the first of these
cases, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court upheld both the economic and equal rights
of the plaintiff. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court began to uphold
state economic regulations that explicitly discriminated against Blacks or
women, even when such laws violated economic liberty principles.7 But when
the Court had before it restrictions on occupational liberty with no racist or
sexist component, it often struck down the challenged law.' When the Court's
hostility toward equal rights and its protection of economic liberty came into
direct conflict in 1908 in Berea College v. Kentucky,9 the Court decided the
6. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7. See infra notes 14-22, 29-33 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 23-28, 34-36 and accompanying text.
9. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
[Vol. 100: 725
Civil Rights
case on a technicality, and thus was able to continue its "equal rights excep-
tion" to economic liberty.
ick Wo involved a San Francisco ordinance which required wooden
laundries to close. The ordinance was disguised as a fire protection measure,
but it was actually a discriminatory rule designed to eliminate Chinese laun-
dries, which were usually housed in wooden buildings. Not only was the law
designed to harm disproportionately Chinese immigrants, but it also was
administered unevenly, so that whites who owned wooden laundries managed
to escape the force of the law, while the government prosecuted Chinese
laundry owners.
Yick Wo, a Chinese laundryman, challenged the law. The Supreme Court,
applying established civil rights principles, struck down the law. In its opinion,
the Court initially emphasized that occupational liberty is of fundamental
importance, particularly in light of the recent American experience with slavery:
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.10
The Court then ruled that the laundry law violated the equal protection compo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment "Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.., the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."'"
These two excerpts from the Yick Wo opinion summarize the essence of the
traditional American civil rights vision. 2 An individual of any race had the
right to control his' 3 labor free from government interference and to be free
from discriminatory treatment by the government. Unfortunately, racist doc-
trines soon conquered the legal world, and rather than establishing an important
precedent for judicial protection of both equal rights and economic liberty, the
Court's protection of equal rights in Yick Wo turned out to be an aberration.
B. Plessy v. Ferguson
In the 1880's and 1890's, state ordinances requiring the public segregation
of Blacks and whites began to spring up across the United States. Among these
ordinances was a Louisiana railroad car segregation law that the Supreme Court
10. 118 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 373-74.
12. C. BOLICK, supra note 1, at 128-29.
13. In at least some circles, civil rights were thought to extend to women as well as to men. See, e.g.,
Ritchie v. People, 155111. 98 (1895) (women have same constitutional right to freedom of contract and same
natural right to occupational liberty as men).
1990)
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sustained against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge in the now infamous case
of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 The Court used broad, sweeping language that seemed
to deny that any manner of segregation law would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment:
[Plessy's] argument also assumes that social prejudices may be over-
come by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro
except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept
this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affimities, a mutual appreciation
of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.15
The problem with the Court's argument is that Plessy, the "Negro"16 plain-
tiff, was not asking anyone to "enforce" the "commingling of the races." He
was simply asking that the Court not allow the State of Louisiana to prohibit
whites and Blacks from interacting on trains when the train company itself
allowed such interaction. Despite the Court's rhetoric, Blacks and whites did
interact in public to a large extent before the Plessy decision,17 including on
trains,"8 and it was only the state-enforced Jim Crow laws that led to a rigid
system of segregation in the South.19
Thus, the Court's claimed deference to custom was a ruse. This claim might
have made sense if Louisiana forced unwilling train companies and individuals
to integrate, but the law instead required companies to enforce segregation. The
Court's actual motivation appears later in the decision, when it states that
"[1iegislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences ... ."0 While still paying lip service to
custom, the Court revealed its actual motivation to be the crude (although then
popular) set of racist nostrums that saw Blacks as an inferior, almost subhuman
race.
21
While the Plessy Court allowed state police power to run rampant in the
name of segregation against the economic liberty of train owners and passen-
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. Id. at 551.
16. Plessy had one Black great-grandparent, enough to be considered a Negro under the applicable
statute.
17. See C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 36-43 (3d ed. 1974).
18. Id. at 38-40. Railroad companies often opposed segregation laws because of the expense involved
in enforcing them. Epstein, Race and the Police Power: 1890 to 1937, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741,747
(1989) (explaining economic costs involved in enforcing segregation on railroads).
19. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text; see also C. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 33-34
(segregation on trains and streetcars was becoming progressively rarer until, in wake of Plessy, laws
mandating segregation passed).
20. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
21. See generally Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE LJ. 624




gers,2 the court soon began to recognize the right of individuals to contract
freely in the context of government regulations that did not involve explicit
racial issues.
C. Freedom of Contract Cases
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,'a a case involving regulations on insurance com-
panies, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause included freedom of contract.
The most famous case applying this principle is Lochner v. New York?4
Lochner involved a challenge to a New York statute that prohibited employ-
ers from employing a baker for more than sixty hours per week. New York
State asserted that since an individual's labor ultimately belongs to the state,
the state has a right to regulate working conditions:
The State, in undertaking this regulation, has a right to safeguard
the citizen against his own lack of knowledge. In dealing with certain
classes of men the State may properly say that, for the purpose of
having able-bodied men at its command when it desires, it shall not
permit these men, when engaged in dangerous or unhealthful occupa-
tions, to work for a longer period of time each day than is found to be
in the interest of the health of the person upon whom the legislation
acts .25
In a stirring defense of individual liberty and civil rights principles, the
majority of the Supreme Court Justices rejected arguments that the citizen is
ultimately beholden to the government and that the government has the right
and duty to protect an individual from exercising freedom of choice. The Court
stated that it must "determine which shall prevail-the right of the individual
to labor for such time as he may choose, or the right of the State to prevent
the individual from laboring or from entering into any contract to labor, beyond
a certain time prescribed by the State."'
The Court added that if New York's statist argument succeeded:
Not only the hours of employ6s, but the hours of employers, could be
regulated, and doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well
as athletes and artisans, could be forbidden to fatigue their brains and
bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the fighting strength of the
State be impaired.27
22. See Epstein, supra note 18.
23. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. Id. at 51 (argument for defendant in error) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 60-61.
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The Court's opinion signaled the start of the "Lochner era," in which the Court
cast a skeptical eye toward economic regulation, particularly if it interfered with
occupational liberty.' Support for the principle of constitutional protection
for freedom of contract and occcupational liberty was nearly unanimous on the
Court. With the exception of Justice Holmes' lone opinion, the dissenters did
not deny that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected
occupational liberty. Instead, they expressed their belief that the statute in
question was a valid health measure under the police power, and was therefore
not constitutionally infirm.
Despite the Court's Lochner ruling, in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon29 the
Court sustained an Oregon law prohibiting women from working more than ten
hours per day in factories or laundries. The Court upheld the law on the
grounds that women need special protection from physical labor3" because they
are not physically capable of competing with men in the labor market. More-
over, according to the Court, the public has a particular interest in women's
health because healthy mothers are needed "to preserve the strength and vigor
of the race." 31 Ironically, the public interest language of this decision is remi-
niscent of the New York State argument rejected by the Court in Lochner 2
What differentiates Muller from Lochner is the Court's acceptance of the state's
contention that the statute was a health measure, not a labor statute meant to
aid some workers at the expense of others, and thus was a valid exercise of the
police power.33
In another 1908 case, Adair v. United States,34 the Court, relying heavily
on Lochner, struck down a federal law banning interstate railroads from enforc-
ing "yellow dog" contracts 35 against their employees on economic liberty
grounds. Adair, the chief of operations of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
was prosecuted for firing a worker who had joined a union in violation of his
contract with the railroad. In overturning Adair's indictment, Justice Harlan
wrote that the flip side of freedom of contract for the individual worker is the
equal freedom of the employer "to prescribe the conditions upon which he will
accept such labor from the person offering to sell it."'36
28. See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation,
92 YALE L.L 1357, 1362 n.17 (1983) (Lochner era Supreme Court struck down legislation benefiting
unionized labor at expense of nonunion labor, but did not strike down legislation that redistributed income
from rich to poor).
29. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
30. Id. at 422.
31. Id. at 421.
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. This supports Richard Epstein's argument that the ultimate flaw in the Lochner opinion is that it
gave too much scope to the police power and too little protection to economic liberty. Epstein, supra note
18.
34. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
35. A yellow dog contract forbids an employee to join a union.
36. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174.
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D. Berea College: Occupational Liberty versus Segregation
The tension between the Court's refusal to protect equal rights and its
protection of economic liberty culminated in Berea College v. Kentucky.37
Berea College, a small, private, racially integrated school, was the only institu-
tion of higher learning in Kentucky that accepted Blacks apart from the Ken-
tucky State Industrial College.38 The Kentucky Day Law, passed during the
1904 legislative session, prohibited the instruction of Black and white students
in the same school, whether private or public.39 The law clearly was aimed
directly at Berea College.
The college challenged the law unsuccessfully throughout the Kentucky
judicial system, and the case finally reached the United States Supreme Court.
The college hoped that the right to pursue the occupation of private school
teaching without unreasonable governmental interference would follow logically
from the earlier freedom of contract cases.' Citing Yick Wo, Allgeyer, and
Lochner, Berea argued that "a private school stands on exactly the same footing
as any other private business .... The statute is... an arbitrary interference
with the rights of the people in the conduct of their private business and in the
pursuit of their ordinary occupations." 4'
The State of Kentucky responded as the State of New York had in Lochner:
"The welfare of the State and community is paramount to any right or privilege
of the individual citizen. The rights of the citizen are guaranteed, subject to the
welfare of the State."'42
In ruling against the college, the Court upheld the law on the narrowest
possible grounds. 43 It sidestepped the inherent contradiction between forced
segregation and freedom of contract by ruling that because Berea College was
established under state charter, the state could regulate it in any way it chose
as long as the regulation did not violate the original intent of the charter ("the
education of all persons who may attend").44 Justice Brewer, writing for the
Court, pointed out that the college could still educate all persons, as long as
Blacks and whites were separated. 45
37. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
38. Roback, Rules v. Discretion: Berea College v. Kentucky, 20 INT'L J. GROUP TENSIONS 47, 51
(1990).
39. Public schools had been segregated since their inception. Id. at 50.
40. 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHIDT, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 731 (1984).
41. Berea, 211 U.S. at 48 (argument for plaintiff in error).
42. Id. at 51 (argument for defendant in error).
43. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1:
The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 452 (1982).
44. Berea, 211 U.S. at 56. The Court hinted that the law might have been unconstitutional had it been
applied to an individual rather than a corporation, but the Court did not explicitly consider that question.
Id. at 54. Despite Berea's direct challenge, the Court did not mention Lochner at all.
45. Id. at 57.
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As in Plessy, the lone dissenter in Berea College was Justice Harlan. In
Plessy, Harlan had based his opposition to a segregation statute on a defense
of equal rights. In Berea College, however, his opposition rested on a defense
of economic liberty. He wrote:
The right to impart instruction... is, beyond question, part of one's
liberty as guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of
the United States. This court has more than once said that the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment embraces "the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties," and "to be free
to use them in all lawful ways.""
Harlan was the only Justice who sought to protect both halves of the civil rights
equation as expressed in Yick Wo.
The Yick Wo decision implied that the Supreme Court would protect basic
traditional freedoms, both "economic liberty" and "equal rights," on behalf of
all residents of the United States. In Lochner, the Court indicated that when
a statute applied to all workers, it was still willing to protect economic rights
from arbitrary governmental intrusion. By the time Berea was decided in 1908,
however, it was clear that the Court had decided to uphold governmental
economic regulation directed against Blacks and women.
This apparent paradox becomes somewhat less puzzling when we consider
the prevailing ideology of race of that time:
[A]mong biologists, sociologists and social anthropologists as well as
journalists and political commentators, the assumptions... that races
were discrete entities and that the white or "Caucasian" race was superi-
or... were taken for granted....
. .. Thus, in the same fashion that an intelligent zoo keeper sepa-
rates the lions and the elephants in different compounds, the Supreme
Court endorsed the proposition that biologically distinct Negroes and
whites need not be given identical treatment.47
Similarly, the Court's decision in Muller reflected the dominant sentiment of
the day that women were the inferior sex and thus needed special protec-
46. Id. at 67-68 (Harlan, L, dissenting) (quoting Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589).




As this Note Will argue in the next two sections, by enforcing freedom of
contract in the workplace, the Court promoted the interests of minorities,
immigrants, and women. On the other hand, when the Court ignored equal
rights and upheld segregation statutes, it not only harmed Blacks, but also
succeeded in subverting the market order it otherwise claimed to be protecting.
II. FREEDOM OF CONTRACr AS PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGrTS
In a truly free market, all have an equal right to buy and sell their labor to
the highest bidder. Anyone who wants to discriminate must pay an economic
cost by either acquiring an inferior employee or paying a higher wage. Indeed,
Gary Becker's influential book, The Economics of Discrimination, argues that
in a pure market environment invidious employment discrimination would tend
to disappear as economic forces overcame discriminatory preferences.49
The political marketplace, however, operates under different rules. Rather
than having to pay an economic price for discrimination, people who prefer
discrimination need only pay with a vote. Discriminatory legislation not only
satisfies voters' prejudices, but can also operate to the economic advantage of
the politically dominant group.
Around the turn of the century Blacks, women, and immigrants were largely
disenfranchised. As one would logically expect, labor legislation passed at that
time tended to benefit politically dominant native white males at the expense
of these groups.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's general pattern of upholding freedom
of contract against legislative interventions promoted by enfranchised white
males benefitted the politically disadvantaged. When the Court stepped in to
preserve this freedom in Yick Wo, Lochner, and Adair, the prime beneficiaries
were members of the disenfranchised classes. But when the Court refused to
intervene, as in Muller and Berea, the consequences for the politically power-
less were devastating.
48. For an early critique of the sexism in Muller, see Note, Constitutional Law-Regulation of
Conditions of Employment of Women: A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U.L. REv. 276 (1933).
49. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Becker has been criticized on
the grounds that his thesis seems to be contradicted by evidence showing long-run earnings differences
between different American ethnic groups. It should be noted, however, that the United States does not
operate (and has never operated) in a pure market environment. Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim
Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHL. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1984). Moreover, cultural factors
may play a large role in determining ethnic groups' incomes. See generally T. SOWELL, ETHNIc AMERICA
282-84 (1981) (ethnic group's culture and history are significant factors in determining its economic status
in society). While one might take issue with the extreme version of the Becker thesis, the profit motive in
a free market clearly does create disincentives for discrimination.
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A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins and the California Labor Market
The highly competitive California labor market served as the historical
backdrop for Yick Wo v. Hopkins. White union leaders and members believed
that Chinese immigrant workers were undercutting their wage demands. 0 The
Union Labor Party and its allies therefore sponsored a racist "Chinese Must
GO!" political campaign." The initial legislative result of this campaign was
a law prohibiting California corporations from hiring Chinese laborers. That
law was struck down by a federal circuit court 2 Despite that failure, the
racial hatred stirred up by the unions gave other interest groups an opportunity
to use anti-Chinese sentiment to their own advantage. While the actual origins
of the laundry law are somewhat hazy, Circuit Judge Sawyer wrote of it:
The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordi-
nance, and of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to
drive out of business all the numerous small laundries, especially those
owned by Chinese, and give a monopoly of the business to the large
institutions established and carried on by means of large associated
Caucasian capital.53
Regardless of whether Sawyer correctly pinpointed the origins of the law,
it is probable that both the racial hatred stirred by the white unions and the
economic interests of the California elites' played major roles in the passage
of the law. In any event, the law, though facially neutral, was clearly designed
to harm Chinese immigrants, and it would have had that effect whether admin-
istered neutrally or not.
B. Lochner: Protection for Immigrant Bakers
While the Yick Wo decision still stands as a much-praised early example
of a civil rights victory, Lochner v. New York is one of the most reviled cases
of all time. According to one scholar, Lochner and its progeny have been
"virtually universally rejected on sound political-moral grounds" and are now
50. See generally A. SAxON, THIB NDISPENSABLE EXEmY: LABOR AND THE TI-CE E MovEM ENT
IN CALIWORNIA (1971) (outlining conflicts between unions and immigrants).
51. Roche, supra note 47, at 122.
52. In re Tibureio Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
53. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal.), aff'd sub nom. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
54. John Roche asserts that the law was struck down as a favor to California's "great corporate figures"
who were trying to bust the unions. Roche, supra note 47, at 122. But it is difficult to see how allowing
independent Chinese laundries to operate, thus contracting the potential manual labor supply, could have
helped California businessmen or hurt unions. On the contrary, removing Chinese immigrants from the
potential manual labor pool would logically result in an increase in white workers' bargaining power
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the subject of "widespread condemnation.""5 Yet, as we shall see, the fact
patterns of ick Wo and Lochner were very similar.
Most scholars who study Lochner misunderstand the decision. This misun-
derstanding arises from the belief that the law in question in Lochner was
enacted out of a desire to help downtrodden workers who, because of their
weak bargaining position, could not help themselves. 6 Thus, the Lochner deci-
sion is supposedly "vulnerable to the claim that [it] benefitted established
economic interests at the expense of the relatively powerless." 57
Part of this misunderstanding derives from the language of the majority
decision, which said that the maximum hours law under review was not a health
measure, but was "passed from other motives."5" Many scholars have taken
this to mean that the majority disapproved of the law because the real motive
behind it was to redistribute wealth.59 There is, however, no economic reason
why passing maximum hours laws would necessarily result in higher overall
wages for bakers.60 A worker who must toil fewer hours generally will get
paid proportionally less.
Moreover, as Justice O'Brien pointed out in his dissent at the state level,
the bakery statute did not actually restrict hours worked. Under the statute, as
long as no baker worked more than sixty hours in a single bakery, "[n]o
restrictions are imposed upon the servant with respect to the hours of labor or
otherwise.... [M]e has a perfect right to work as many hours in a day or week
as he may want to .... 61
If the motivation behind the law was not to redistribute income, nor (be-
cause it did not actually restrict hours worked) to protect the health of the
worker,6' then what were the "other motives" referred to by the Court? As
55. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY MAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 115-16 (1982). This bit of conven-
tional wisdom has, however, recently come under attack. See, e.g., Phillips, Another Look At Economic
Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 265, 266 n.7 (citing pro-Lochner articles).
56. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITTTlIONAL LAW 569 (9th ed. 1975) (Lochner bakery law was
"designed to protect bakery workers in an unequal bargaining position"); Bell, Does Discrimination Make
Economic Sense?, 15 HUMAN RIGHTs 38, 41-42 (1988) (just as Plessy harmed disadvantaged Blacks by
upholding segregation ordinance, Lochner harmed "powerless" and "exploited" whites by striking down
protective labor legislation).
57. Phillips, supra note 55, at 275.
58. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
59. See, e.g., Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 UMKC L. REv. 175,
185 (1986) (Lochner Court was motivated by desire to prevent state legislatures from redistributing income
from rich to poor). But cf. Epstein, supra note 28.
60. Indeed, this applies, if not as obviously, to all labor legislation. L VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION
617 (1949) (overall, labor legislation and union pressure do not help workers and may actually harm them
by causing wages to rise faster than capital accumulation).
61. People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145, 177, 69 N.E. 373, 385 (1904) (O'Brien, I., dissenting).
62. Another piece of evidence that the statute in question was not truly a health measure is the fact
that approximately 50% of bakers, apparently those not in direct competition with large unionized bakeries,
were exempted from the statute's provisions. Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17
Sw. U.L. REV. 627, 669 (1988).
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in Yick Wo, the political force behind the legislation in question was hostility
to competition in the labor market from immigrants:
Many workers in the small bakeries of New York City, and probably
elsewhere in the state, were recent immigrants unable to speak English,
who were attracted to owners speaking their language .... The time
limitation on working hours would have forced the small owners to hire
additional help.... Consequently the restrictions on working hours
meant higher labor costs for the small bakers .... A number of the
small bakers would have to terminate their businesses.63
Most small, immigrant-owned and operated, nonunion bakeries could not
survive under a maximum hours regime. Workers in these bakeries would
prepare the bread in the evening, put it in the ovens, and then sleep until
morning when they removed the bread.' The high fixed costs to employers
of providing shelter to the workers could only be offset by a long working day.
Not surprisingly, large bakers supported the law in order to reduce competi-
tion.65 Bakers' unions also supported the law.66 Because unionized bakers
already generally worked fewer than sixty hours a week,67 and thus did not
need the law to reduce their hours, their obvious goal was to try to reduce
competition from nonunionized, immigrant bakers in the hope that the constric-
tion in the supply of bakery labor would lead to higher wages for union
members.68 Therefore, in striking down New York's maximum hours law, the
Supreme Court protected not only occupational liberty, but also the equal rights
of immigrant laborers against discriminatory legislation.69
C. Muller: The Court Fails to Protect Women and Immigrants
Three years afterLochner, the Supreme Court failed to protect occupational
liberty in Muller. Aided by the now infamous "Brandeis Brief," which detailed
the alleged ill health effects of long hours of labor on women, the Court saw
the law more as a regulatory measure aimed at preserving women's health than
the actual threat to women's economic liberty that it was. Unfortunately,
women's rights received the same short shrift as other equal rights issues of
63. B. SIEGAN, EcoNoMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITTION 117 (1980).
64. Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 158 n.6 (1987).
65. B. SIEGAN, supra note 63, at 350 n.29 and accompanying text; Epstein, The Mistakes of1937, 11
GEO. MASON U.L REv. 5, 17 (1988) ("The statute was championed by rival unions and their employ-
er's . ... '.
66. Epstein, supra note 65.
67. B. SIEGAN, supra note 63, at 117-18.
68. Epstein, supra note 65, at 158 & n.6; Note, supra note 5, at 1372.
69. The Lochner majority did not explicitly state that it was protecting the rights of immigrants and
not simply the abstract freedom to contract. However, the Court did say that"Ithe purpose of a statute must
be determined from the natural and legal effect of the language employed," and it cited Yick Wo, another
case involving discrimination against immigrants, for the proposition that "[t]he court looks beyond the mere
letter of the law in such cases." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
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the period. The Court therefore upheld the law, which was representative of
a popular form of legislation that served to prevent women from competing in
the workforce.70
In Lochner, the Supreme Court's protection of freedom of contract pre-
served economic opportunity for immigrants. The Court's acquiescence to the
spread of restrictive labor legislation against women in Muller,71 on the other
hand, deprived women and especially immigrant women of the opportunity to
compete in the labor market.72
D. Adair: Protection of Blacks From Union Discrimination
The principles of freedom of contract and occupational liberty, when
enforced by the Court as in Lochner, protected the equal rights of immigrants.
Similarly, in Adair the Court protected the rights of Blacks by enforcing
freedom of contract. Indeed, the Adair decision was perhaps the most favorable
decision regarding the equal rights of Blacks made by the Court until Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka.73 The Adair decision not only benefited
Blacks by preventing racist white unions from monopolizing the interstate
railroad labor market,74 it also set a precedent that precluded the possibility
of further, more restrictive, pro-organized labor legislation. The decision thus
gave Blacks a respite from the destructive effects of labor unions on their
employment prospects.75
70. See Taylor, Protective Labor Legislation, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE 267 (W.
McElroy ed. 1982) (protective legislation for women served to keep them out of well-paying jobs).
71. After Muller, even state courts that had previously struck down maximum hours laws for women
upheld them. Compare Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98 (1895) (striking down maximum hours law for women)
with W.C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 IlL 509 (1910) (upholding maximum hours law for women). For
a discussion of other state cases, see Note, supra note 48.
72.
Maximum-hours laws.., reduced not only women's hours of work in 1920 but their employment
as well. Further, the effect was not uniform by race and nativity: While the employment of
foreign-born women was significantly reduced-by as much as 30 percent in the most restrictive
states-the employment of native white women was largely unaffected.
Landes, The Effect ofState Maximum-Hours Laws on the Employment of Women in 1920,88 J. POL. ECON.
476, 476 (1980). Landes points out that organized labor was the prime lobbyist for such laws nationwide.
Id. at 489.
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. See Williams, Freedom to Contract: Blacks and Labor Organizations, GOV'T UNION REv., Summer
1981, at 28, 31-32 (discussing harm done to Blacks by banning of yellow dog contracts under Railway Labor
Act, as amended in 1934).
75. White unions excluded Blacks from such union positions as "electricians, plumbers, gas and
steamfitters, railroad engineers and firemen, stationary engineers, cranemen, hoistmen, machinists, and
hundreds of other skilled and semi-skilled occupations." 3 P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1900-
1909, at 240 (1981). By 1912, outside of the United Mine Workers, with 40,000 Black members, the largest
Black membership in an American Federation of Labor union was 6,000. And far more typical were the
Pressmen, Lithographers, Photo-Engravers, Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, Potters, Glass Botttle Blowers,
Hatters, Molders, Pattern Makers, Glass Workers, Boot and Shoe Workers, and Wood Workers unions, each
of which had between zero and a dozen Black members. Id. at 254; see generally id. at 233-55 (discussing
discriminatory union policies); H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1977)
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Union policies had especially harmful effects on Blacks in the South.76
For example, as late as the early 1890's, Blacks constiuted a high percentage
of skilled workers in the southern building and railroad industries.77 But be-
cause of exclusionary union policies in the South which later spread to other
parts of the country, by 1950 Black participation in these fields had sunk to
insignificant levels.78 Blacks were banned from union apprenticeship programs,
and the few who managed to acquire skills despite the obstacles had to work
at nonunion jobs.
Southern states furthered the unions' goals by passing laws requiring
apprenticeships before a worker could practice a craft. 9 Some of the laws
were explicitly discriminatory while others were facially neutral but were
actually intended to restrict Blacks' access to the labor market.8" Southern
states also frustrated Blacks' opportunity to attain skilled positions by banning
them from public vocational schools,8" in effect subsidizing only white
workers' training. Other governmental intrusions into the labor market in the
South severely restricted Black workers' opportunities in unskilled labor as
well.82
Despite the efforts of racists and opportunists to restrict the market for
Black labor, because of the general freedom of contract regime that existed
around the time of Lochner and Adair, an extremely high 71% of Blacks were
employed in 1910.13 Significant disparities in Black and white unemployment
rates did not occur until after the Supreme Court upheld the major New Deal
labor legislation of the 1930's.1
In general, when freedom of contract was judicially protected, it was a boon
to immigrants85 and Blacks.8 6 The fact that women could not contract freely,
(historical overview).
76. Southern labor policies are especially important to study for the period under consideration in this
Note because the vast majority of Blacks lived in the South at this time. However, the northern unions,
which were far more powerful than their southern counterparts, did not necessarily treat Blacks any better.
Higgs, Black Progress and the Persistence of Racial Economic Inequalities, 1865-1940, in THE QUESTION
OF DISCRIMINATION 9, 23 (W. Darity & S. Shulman eds. 1989).
77. P. FONER, supra note 75, at 238.
78. Id.
79. See generally G. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 53-58 (1910) (discussing
apprenticeship laws).
80. Id. at 53 ('lit is scarcely open to argument that, in making such laws, [the legislatures] did not
have in mind primarily Negroes.").
81. P. FONER, supra note 75, at 240.
82. See generally Roback, supra note 49 (discussing enticement and contract enforcement laws,
vagrancy laws, emigrant-agent laws, and the convict-lease system). Professor Roback concludes that
"[e]xploitation was not inherent in the capitalist system; rather, government power had to be specifically
mobilized to achieve this end." Id. at 1163. She adds that "the evidence indicates that the law, not the
market, was the chief oppressor of blacks in the Jim Crow period." Id. at 1192.
83. W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 43 (1982) (in 1910, 71% of Blacks over nine years
of age were employed compared with 51% of whites).
84. H. HILL, supra note 75, at 96.
85. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text; see also T. SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES




meanwhile, severely restricted their opportunities in the labor market.8 7 Despite
the progressive-sounding rhetoric that usually accompanied it, legislation
enforcing restrictions on contract was generally reactionary special interest
legislation meant to preserve the power and prerogatives of the existing elite.
Economic freedom and equal rights went hand in hand.
IIl. SEGREGATION LAWS V. EcoNoMIc FRBEDOM
Rigid segregation, this section argues, was a product of government, rather
than market-enforced custom. This theory is a controversial one. Many scholars
assume that if a segregation ordinance is passed, it must be because a majority
of the voters strongly desire segregation.88 They therefore conclude that segre-
gation would have occurred with or without government prompting. The
theories of public choice economics, 9 however, lead to the opposite conclu-
sion. According to leading public choice economists, legislation is passed when
"collective action" problems arise such that voluntary actions will not accom-
plish the goals of a group.9 When voluntary efforts fail, groups turn to gov-
ernment to enforce their goals via state coercion.
A. Segregation and Common Carriers
In her study of streetcar segregation in the South, Professor Jennifer Roback
shows that streetcars across the South were integrated before the government
intervened.91 White passengers may have had a preference for segregation, but
Black passengers were virulently opposed to it, and often would launch boycotts
against segregated lines.92 The streetcar owners were concerned with maximiz-
ing revenues, and Roback notes that "[s]egregation is profit maximizing [only]
if the revenue gained from white passengers outweighs the lost revenue from
black passengers and the direct costs of providing segregation."'93 Blacks were
willing to boycott segregated cars, but whites were not willing to boycott
integrated ones. Therefore, as economic theory would predict, the cars remained
integrated.
86. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 74, at 28-47; cf. M.
FRIEDMAN, CAPTALISM AND FREEDOM 109 (1962) ("The maintenance of the general rules of private
property and of capitalism have been a major source of opportunity for Negroes ... .
87. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 98.
89. See generally D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1978) (overview of public choice theory).
90. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECIVE ACTION (1965) (classic work on collective
action problem).
91. Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars, 46 L ECON.
HIST. 893 (1986).
92. The best account of those boycotts is Meier & Rudwick, The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow
Streetcars in the South, 1900-1906, 55 L AM. HIST. 756 (1969).
93. Roback, supra note 91, at 896.
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However, once the Supreme Court allowed state-mandated segregation in
the railroad cases, the cost to prejudiced whites of fulfilling their preference
for segregation dropped from the costs of launching an organized boycott or
paying a higher fare to the price of a vote. White citizens unwilling to pay a
private price to ride in a segregated car voted for candidates who favored
segregation laws. Through the democratic process, the costs of segregation were
imposed on the disenfranchised Black passengers and the regulated streetcar
companies.94
Plessy and the other train segregation cases95 are difficult examples to
incorporate in this analysis because railroads, with their state charters and
special privileges, were pure monopolies,96 and railroad travel was indispens-
able to long-distance travelers and therefore difficult to boycott.97 The extent
of segregation on common carriers around the time that Plessy was decided is
still an open question.98 However, there is no doubt that at least some common
carriers would have remained integrated had they not been subject to govern-
ment-ordered segregation. Indeed, the arrest of Plessy was apparently prear-
ranged by the company and the civil rights group planning to challenge it.99
Other examples of corporate resistance to segregation ordinances abound as
well.1 00
In any event, Plessy had a significance well beyond its implications for
segregation on railroads and other common carriers. The depth of the racism
94. Roback, Racism As Rent-Seeking, 27 EcoN. INQUIRY 661, 674 (1989); Roback, supra note 91, at
897-98. In at least one city, Houston, Black entrepeneurs started jitneys in competition with the segregated
streetcars. Dressman, "Yes, We Have No Jitneys!" Transportation Issues in Houston's Black Community,
1914-1924, 9 HOUSTON REV. 69, 73 (1987). In 1922, the Black-owned jitneys were ordered by the city to
discontinue service. Id. at 76.
95. See infra note 100.
96. Cf. Maltz, "Separate But Equal" and the Law of Common Carriers in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 RUTGERS L. 553 (1986) (Plessy cannot be properly understood withoutreference to special
rules under which common carriers operated).
97. When serious competition later arrived in the form of cross-country buses, the Jim Crow train laws
were promptly extended to buses as well. C. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 116.
98. In The Plessy Case, Charles Lofgren concludes that voluntary segregation was increasing. His
conclusion apparently relies on the fact that segregation laws began to be passed around 1890. C. LOIREN,
THE PLEssY CAsE 7-17 (1987). Such evidence leads Professor Roback to the opposite conclusion, however.
She says that segregation laws must have been a product of the fact that segregation was not happening
voluntarily. If segregation had been the rule, laws enforcing segregation would not have been needed.
Telephone interview with Jennifer Roback, Professor of Economics, George Mason University (Sept. 6,
1989). Lofgren suggests that a case by case study is needed to discover whether segregation resulted from
custom or law. C. LOFGREN, supra, at 17. Professor Roback concluded her study of the streetcars of various
southern cities with the finding that "[i]t is unlikely thatpractice anticipated law in this area." Roback, supra
note 91, at 916.
99. See Oberst, The Strange Career ofPlessy v. Ferguson, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 393 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900) (railroad challenges Kentucky
segregation law on ground that it violated commerce clause); Louisville, N.O. & Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi,
133 U.S. 587 (1890) (railroad challenges Mississippi segregation law on commerce clause grounds); Smith
v. State, 100 Tenn. 494 (1898) (conductor refuses to assign Blacks to segregated car); Roback, supra note
93, at 894 ("[Tlhe streetcar companies frequently resisted segregation, both as custom and law."); id. at




and the broad language in Plessy gave local governments the legal green light
to pass all manner of laws regulating the racial policies of private businesses.
In the years following Plessy, laws segregating everything from hospitals to tent
shows to fraternal societies were passed throughout the South. 1
B. The Showdown Between Economic Freedom and State-Enforced Segregation
Forced segregation laws represented perhaps the most egregious governmen-
tal violation of the rights to property and freedom of contract between the Civil
War and the New Deal era. It was therefore only logical that a challenge to
such laws on economic liberty grounds would soon arise, as it did in Berea
College.102
Berea College's Supreme Court argument also posed a direct challenge to
the logic of the majority opinion in Plessy'03 by pointing out that the Ken-
tucky law prohibited completely voluntary interaction between the races:
Social equality between persons of the white and colored races, or
between persons of the same race, cannot be enforced by legislation,
nor can the voluntary association of persons of different races, or
persons of the same race, be constitutionally prohibited by legislation
unless it is shown to be immoral, disorderly, or for some other reason
so palpably injurious to the public welfare as to justify a direct interfer-
ence with the personal liberty of the citizen; and even in such a case
the restriction should go no further than is absolutely necessary.104
While this argument did not succeed with the Court, the importance of this
point cannot be overestimated. Alternative histories are easy to imagine and
impossible to prove, but there can be little doubt that had the Supreme Court
applied the principles of economic liberty to facially discriminatory statutes,
segregation-and discrimination against Blacks in general-would have been
far less onerous.0 5 Thus, the acquiescence of the Supreme Court to the denial
of economic liberty in the form of segregation laws contributed to the establish-
ment of Jim Crow in areas where it would never have spread had the free
market been allowed to operate.
101. C. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 98-100.
102. Professor Roback points out that Berea College "illustrates that at least [one] aspect of the
southern segregation system was based upon [government] intervention into the market order, rather than
on the market order itself." Roback, supra note 38, at 61.
103. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
104. Berea, 211 U.S. at 50 (argument for plaintiff in error).
105. Even a scholar as hostile to the free market as Randall Kennedy acknowledges that whites "were
unable to control blacks simply with market pressures." Kennedy, Book Review, 98 YALE L.. 521, 534
(1989).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional interpretation of the Plessy and Lochner decisions views
them as two similarly reactionary, misdirected decisions from the same constitu-
tional era.106 This Note has shown that such a conception is false. The classi-
cal American "civil fights" ideology, as expressed in Yick Wo, stood for judicial
protection of both equal rights and economic freedom. Because of pervasive
racism and sexism in American intellectual circles around turn of the century,
equal rights were not protected in Plessy or Muller. Constitutional safeguards
for economic freedom, however, survived into the Lochner era. This distinction
was arbitrary; the Court's lack of support for equal rights led to state-imposed
segregation and restrictions on women's labor,' both tremendous impositions
on economic liberty. Meanwhile, the Court's defense of economic liberty
guaranteed economic opportunity to disadvantaged Blacks and immigrants.
Indeed, had the Court applied the principles of economic freedom to segregation
cases, the onerous laws would have been struck down.107
Today, legal ideology has come full circle, and equal rights appear to be
well protected by the courts, while economic liberties, including occupational
liberty, are generally ignored.108 While judicial protection from government
discrimination has been a great victory for the individual rights of women and
members of minority groups, the neglect of the other half of the classical view
of civil rights, the protection of economic liberty, has had devastating conse-
quences for disadvantaged individuals, especially Blacks.3 9 Organized labor
and professional associations are still using governmental power to restrict
economic opportunity by supporting restrictive legislation. As in Lochner and
Adair, such legislation is not explicitly aimed at minority groups, but the laws
disproportionately harm members of such groups nonetheless.
Many of the union abuses discussed earlier in this Note have been amelio-
rated by federal, state, and local civil rights laws, but Blacks are still vastly
underrepresented in skilled trades due to artifical barriers imposed by crafts
106. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 394-95 (discussing traditional criticisms of Plessy and Lochner);
see also Bell, supra note 56. But see Epstein, supra note 18, at 753 ("Plessy championed big government
because it worked for an assumption of government rectitude. Lochner stood for small (but not small
enough) government.").
107. Cf. Epstein, supra note 18, at 751 ("under the standards for economic liberties developed shortly
thereafter in Lochner, the statute in Plessy would have been doomed"). The Court soon did strike down
one segregation law on economic liberty grounds. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking
down law forbidding purchase of residential property on block in which purchaser would not be in racial
majority).
108. For more on the current status of the two halves of the traditional civil rights vision, including
an argument that equality under the law is currently not well protected, see C. BOLIcK, UNFINISHED
BusINEss: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR AMERICA's THIRD CENTURY (1990); see also R. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS (1985); B. SIEGAN, supra note 63; Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51
U. C. L. REV. 703 (1984); Karlin, supra note 62; Note, supra note 5 (federal courts have neglected their
proper role as protectors of economic liberty from unconstitutional economic regulations).




unions and licensing laws.1 ' Occupational licensing exams generally, particu-
larly those with written sections, discriminate against the poor,' less-
educated,"' and, often, against members of minority groups in general."'
Other government-imposed barriers to economic opportunity include minimum
wage laws," 4 restrictions on taxicab ownership,1 5 bans on jitney servic-
es," 6 the Davis-Bacon Act,"7 restrictions on industrial homework," 8 and
various other forms of government regulation." 9 As Professor Roback con-
cludes: "[G]overment... must be restrained in order to allow disfavored
minorities to make substantial economic progress.""' ° Until the classical civil
rights vision is restored and economic liberty is once again protected, the equal
rights of the disadvantaged will not be fully protected.
The ick Wo decision represented an ephemeral victory for the classical
civil rights vision. Unfortunately, only one half of that vision has ever been
realized at one time. Today, one part of ick Wo, the espousal of equal protec-
tion of the laws, is a legal reality, though still imperfectly administered. The
other part of ick Wo, the one espousing occupational liberty, is practically a
dead letter, despite the fact that the protection of the individual's right to pursue
110. Id. at 94-95.
111. Dorsey, The Occupational Licensing Queue, 15 1 HUM. RESOURCES 420,425 (1980) (licensing
exams test skills most practitioners will never need, and thus cause overinvestment in training, an expense
many poor young people cannot afford).
112. Id. (Black potential beauticians in Missouri and Illinois failed written portions of licensing
examination at a much higher rate than whites while doing as well as whites on practical section). Obvious-
ly, educational disparities between Blacks and whites, rather than any differences in "merit," were respon-
sible for the gap in pass rates.
113. S. Michalik & L. Trubek, Regulating Occupations: Legal Challenges to Licensing Examinations
in Wisconsin (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (whites invariably had higher pass rates than Blacks,
Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asians in twenty-six fields as diverse as real estate brokerage and nursing
in W'isconsin); see also Demsetz, Minorities in the Marketplace, 43 N.C.L. REV. 271, 271 (1965); Wonnell,
Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 91, 124 (1983)
(barriers to occupational liberty are especially harmful to racial and ethnic minorities).
114. See, e.g., Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1972) ('[B]Iacks, youths, and especially black youths[] are subjected
disproportionately to the employment reduction effects of the minimum wage.").
115. W. WVILAMS, supra note 83, at 75-87 (taxicab industry no longer performs traditional role of
entry-level entrepreneurial opportunity because of government-imposed barriers to entry).
116. See, e.g., Newberry, 7ime for Jitneys, Houston Post, Mar. 30, 1987, at 2B, col 1. For a history
of the almost universal ban on urban jitney services, see Eckert & Hilton, The Jitneys, 15 J.L. & ECON.
293, 307-25 (1972).
117. See, e.g., Barry, Congress's Deconstruction Theory, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1990, at 10, 10 (Davis-
Bacon Actprevents small, new construction companies, many owned by Blacks and women, from competing
for federal contracts).
118. Homework, which is opposed by organized labor, allows women who wish to stay home with
their children to do so while still participating in the labor force. Poorer women living in rural areas and
immigrant women, legal and illegal, are the most common homeworkers. See Keller, Unions Battle Against
Jobs in the Home, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1984, §1, at 1, col. 1; see generally International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union v. Dole, 729 F. Supp. 877 (1989) (court allows Department of Labor to relax certain federal
homework regulations over union opposition).
119. See generally P. Bearse, A Study of the Impact of State and Local Regulation On Small and
Minority Businesses (July 4, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (government regulation restricts economic
mobility).
120. Roback, supra note 49, at 1192.
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a lawful occupation free from unwarranted government interference is an
important traditional American liberty,121 an important human right," and
essential to the economic progress of the economically disadavantaged.
A recent federal district court case indicates that the courts might be
becoming more sensitive to the importance of occupational liberty. Ego Brown,
a Black resident of Washington, D.C., was a "shoeshine enterpeneur." He and
the homeless men he employed were succeeding until the D.C. government,
enforcing a 1905 law against outdoor bootblacks which probably had racist
origins, closed them down.12 Brown sued and won.'2 In response to a mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, the judge wrote that "the federal courts' role
in protecting American citizens from unreasonable economic regulation has
been one of the hallmarks of American liberty, prosperity and progress."' 5
The idea of the interconnection between economic liberty and civil rights
is making a comeback in intellectual circles as well.12 As Clint Bolick, Ego
Brown's attorney, noted:
Civil rights and economic liberty are intertwined.... Throughout
history in the United States and elsewhere, racial tolerance and individu-
al freedom have developed most rapidly in practice and as an ideal in
centers of free commerce. Conversely, the subjugation of some individu-
als by others has been most effectively accomplished where the power
of the state has been exploited to deny or limit access to such com-
merce ....
... [T]he contemporary civil rights movement must-as did its
predecessors-commit itself to eliminating arbitrary economic regula-
tions that deprive individuals of their civil right to pursue enterprises
and engage in voluntary commerce. 127
One can imagine that Mr. Yick Wo would surely agree.
121. Conant, Anti-Monopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-house
Cases Re-examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 786 (1982) (protection from government-sponsored monopoly is a
traditional right under Anglo-American common law).
122. Cf. Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONsT. COMMENTARY 169, 183 (1988) ("With the
exception of freedom of religion, nothing is more important than work and a chance at a career or a decent
living.").
123. New Luster for Economic Liberty, INSIGHT, Apr. 10, 1989, at 18.
124. Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352 (1989).
125. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Brown v. Barry, No. 88-0565, slip op. 8 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,
1988); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("ITihe fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness ... are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization ....').
126. This intellectual trend has coincided with the growth in popularity of "classical liberalism" or
"libertarianism," the modern versions of the radical liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries. See generally
N. BARRY, ON CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND LIBERTARIANISM (1987).
127. C. BOLICK, supra note 1, at 94-95.
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